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JURISDICTION
Under

UCA

1953,

78-2A-3(2)(j),

the

Utah

Court

of

Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The defendant presented competent evidence during the
trial.

The

evidence

presented

substantial factual disputes.

by

the

plaintiff

created

The matter was submitted to the

jury and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant.
The judge overturned the jury's verdict by granting a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
The

trial

court's

refusal

to give

an

"unavoidable

accident" instruction was not grounds for overturning the jury's
verdict.
The trial court's finding that the jury was confused
was not supported by the facts and would not be grounds for
reversal of the jury's verdict.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
JOHN M. FRY and JUDITH L. FRY,
Defendants/Third-party
Plaintiff/Appellants,
Case No. 89-0473-CA
v.
WILLIAM C. PETERSEN,
Third-party Defendant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Brief of Appellants, John M. Fry and Judith L. Fry,
hereinafter called "Fry".
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the court err by entering it's order of judgment
notwithstanding

the verdict

even though

substantial

evidence

existed supporting the jury's determination?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a personal injury action based upon a twovehicle accident at an intersection in Orem, Utah.
This matter was tried by jury in front of the Honorable
Boyd L. Park.

After a trial on disputed facts and disputed

expert opinion, the jury found the defendants/appellants, Fry,

not

negligent.

Thereafter

the

court

entered

a

judgment

notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Fry seeks a reversal of the judgment notwithstanding
the verdict entered by the lower court in the face of disputed
evidence, and reinstatement of the jury verdict in his favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
* Subsequent to receiving the briefing schedule by the
Court of Appeals, it was determined that the trial transcript for
the

second

day

of

trial , November

submitted by the reporter.

29,

1988, had

not been

The transcript was received but the

original was not numbered in accordance with Rule 11(b) of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

As a result, references to

that transcript are hereinafter ("TR, pg. " ) .
le

This accident occurred at the intersection of 1300

South and Main Streets in Orem, Utah County, State of Utah.
(R-559, pg. 47).
2.

Petersen was the driver of the Volkswagen. (TR, pg.

3.

Fry, the driver of the other vehicle involved in

6).

the accident, was westbound on 1300 South and intended to turn
left or south.

(TR, pg. 36).

2

4.
Peterson.

Rhodes was a passenger in the Volkswagen driven by

(TR, pg. 55).
5.

Substantial

evidence

existed

that

Fry

was

not

approached

the

negligent:

intersection,

a)

Fry

the

light

testified
turned

through the cycle of the light.
b)

that

red.

as
He

he

stopped

waited

(TR, pg. 36).

During the time he was

stopped

light, he was looking for on-coming traffic.
the exception of a brown station wagon.
c)

and

at the red

He saw none with

(TR, pg. 37).

The brown station wagon was approaching from

the west and was turning left or northbound.

Fry saw no other

headlights or vehicles coming, so he started to make his turn.
(TR, pg. 41, 44).
d)
lane of traffic.

Petersen normally travelled in the left hand
(TR, pg. 19).

However, the collision occurred

in the eastbound traffic's far right lane in the intersection.
(R-559, pg. 58).
e)

Shelley Lambert, Fry's passenger,

testified

that she was looking for on-coming traffic and saw none.

(TR,

pg. 41; TR, pg. 109, 110).
f)

Fry's expert testified that the Volkswagen in

question was obscured from Fry's sight by other traffic. (R-497).

3

6*

Prior to the impact, the Petersen vehicle attempted

to avoid the accident by braking.
7.

(R-559, pg. 51).

The experts called by Rhodes disagreed with Fry's

description of his actions (TR, pg. 36; TR, pg. 156), with the
speed at which Fry proceeded into the intersection, (TR, pg. 39,
TR, pg. 157), with the speed at which the Petersen vehicle was
traveling prior to braking, (R-560, pg. 26; R-560, pg. 36; R-493;
TR, pg. 167), and with the cause of the accident (R-559, pg. 57;
TR, pg. 169; R-497).
8.

Rhodes' experts testified that, based upon their

calculations, Fry was negligent.

(R-559, pg. 57; TR, pg. 169).

Fry's expert testified that, based on his calculations, Fry was
not negligent.
9.
negligence.

(R-467).
The

jury

was

instructed

on

the

issues

of

(R-357, 358). The court further instructed the jury

that the mere fact that an accident happened does not support an
inference that the defendants, or any party, was negligent.
(R-363).

The court refused to instruct the jury on unavoidable

accident.

(R-304, 385).
10.

Petersen made a motion for a directed verdict

which was granted.
11.

(R-387).

Rhodes made a motion for directed verdict based

upon the stipulation that Rhodes, as a passenger in the Petersen
4

vehicle, was not negligent; upon the court's ruling as a matter
of law that a case had not been proven against Petersen; and upon
the

court's

accident".

refusal

to

instruct

the

jury

on

"unavoidable

(R-292).
12.

The court took Fry's motion for directed verdict

under advisement and submitted the matter to the jury.
returned a verdict in favor of Fry when it answered
Special Verdict instruction #1 which stated:

The jury
"No" to

(R-385).

1.
At the time and place of the
incident
in question and under the
circumstances as shown by the evidence, was
defendant, John M. Fry, negligent?
Yes
13.

The

court

subsequently

No

X

entered

a

judgment

notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the plaintiff (R-442),
from which defendant Fry appealed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT MAY ONLY OVERTURN A JURY
VERDICT IF, AFTER VIEWING ALL OF THE EVIDENCE
IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE VERDICT, NO
COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE VERDICT.
At

the

close

of

defendant's

case

in

chief,

the

plaintiff moved, pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
50, for a motion for directed verdict.
part:

5

Rule 50(b) states in

Whenever a motion for directed verdict made
at the close of all the evidence is denied or
for any reason is not granted, the court is
deemed to have submitted the action to the
jury subject to a later determination of the
legal questions raised by the motion.
•

*

*

If a verdict was returned the court
allow the judgment to stand or may reopen
judgment and either order a new trial
direct the entry of judgment as if
requested verdict had been directed....

may
the
or
the

This court is asked to review and reverse the trial
court's entry of

judgment notwithstanding

the verdict.

The

standard that the trial court must apply when considering a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is set out in the
case of Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988).

In that

case the court stated:
The standard to be applied by the trial
court in determining whether to grant a
motion for a j.n.o.v* is stricter than the
standard for deciding to grant a new trial.
A j.n.o.v. can be granted only when the
losing party i« entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
The trial court should grant a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict only if, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the non-movant, it finds that no
competent evidence supports the verdict.

In reviewing the trial

court's determination of such issues, the Court of Appeals must
apply the same standard.

King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 620

(Utah 1987).

In addition to viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the non-movant, the court must accord every
reasonable

inference

fairly drawn from the evidence the same

degree of deference.

Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah

1983)c
Fry's theory of the case was that his view of the
oncoming traffic was obstructed by another vehicle and that his
turning left was reasonable under the existing circumstances.
In support of this theory, competent evidence was presented by
Fry, supported by the direct testimony of his passenger Shelley
Lambert and by the expert testimony of Dr. Rudolf Limpert.
In determining whether or not to grant such a motion,
the court is not allowed to weigh the evidence or to determine
which witnesses it feels are the most persuasive or truthful.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio in Cox v. Oliver Machinery Co., 41
Ohio App. 3d 28, 534 N.E. 2d 855, 857, 858 (1987) stated:
In ruling on a directed verdict — or, in our
case considering such a ruling on appeal — a
court must construe the evidence most
strongly in favor of the non-moving party and
determine whether reasonable minds can come
but to one conclusion on the evidence
submitted, that conclusion being adverse to
non-moving party. (Cite omitted.)
If
reasonable minds can reach different
conclusions, the matter must be submitted to
the jury.
(Cite omitted.)
The court
considers the motion without weighing the
evidence or determining the creditability of
witnesses.
(Cite omitted.)
A motion for

directed verdict raises a question of law
because it examines the materiality of the
evidence rather than the conclusions to be
drawn from the evidence.
Thus, the court
does not determine whether one version of the
facts presented is more persuasive than
another; rather, it determines whether only
one result can be reached under the theories
of
law presented
in the complaint.
(Parenthes is added.)
The record before this court demonstrates that there
was sufficient material evidence to support the jury's verdict.
The jury found that the defendant's actions were reasonable and
prudent under the conditions that they determined existed at the
time of the accident.
Fry and Rhodes both submitted expert testimony which
created a factual dispute.

As stated in Bennion v. LeGrand

Johnson Const. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Utah 1985), "[w]here
evidence is in conflict in a jury trial, we assume that the jury
believed those facts that support its verdict (cite omitted), and
we view the facts and the reasonable inferences that arise from
those facts in a light most supportive of the jury's verdict."
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT RELIED UPON ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE AN
"UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT" INSTRUCTION AS A BASIS
FOR GRANTING A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT.
In discussing the case law on "unavoidable accident,"
it is critical to avoid being distracted by that label.

8

The

trial

court

accident"

became

that

instruction

it

plays

so

involved

failed
in

a

with

the

term

"unavoidable

to examine the role which such an
negligence

claim.

In

Anderton

v.

Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 834 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court
held:
Unavoidable accident, rather than being a
separate legal doctrine, is simply a
recognition of the fact that an incident
causing injury to the plaintiff does not
necessarily give rise to liability in the
defendant.
Where the injury arises from a
set of circumstances which do not reflect a
lack of due care on anyone' part, no recovery
may be had under a theory of negligence, the
accident having been "unavoidable."
* * *

As explained above, a properly drafted
unavoidable accident instruction punctuates
the necessity of finding both negligence and
causation prior to assigning liability. It
is true that such an instruction amounts, in
essence, to a reemphasis of principles
already implicit in other instructions.
The failure of the court to give such an instruction
when requested did not amount to reversible error since the jury
found

in

favor

of the defendant

on the instructions

given.

However, reversible error was committed by the court when it
relied

upon

instruction

the
as

failure
the

basis

to

give
for

its

an

unavoidable

granting

the

notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

9

accident
judgment

With the trial court's discretion in tailoring the jury
instructions to the evidence presented, the court correctly held
that

the defendant's

theory

of the case could,

in fact, be

presented under the jury instructions which were given.
Statement of Facts),

(See

"The trial court has a duty to 'cover the

theories and points of law of both parties in its instructions,
provided there is competent evidence to support them'".
v. Lamborn. 740 P.2d 300, 302 (Utah App. 1987).

Hillier

"The general

rule is that a party is entitled to have his theory of the case
submitted to the jury."

Id.
POINT III.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
GRANTING THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT BECAUSE SUBSTANTIAL
FACTUAL DISPUTES EXISTED.
In evaluating the reasoning behind the court's granting
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it is helpful to look at
the motion submitted by plaintiff.

Rhodes stated that since the

court ruled as a matter of law that Petersen was not negligent
and since the parties stipulated that Rhodes was not negligent,
therefore,

the

court's

refusal

unavoidable accident resulted
negligent.

to

instruct

the

jury

on

in the conclusion that Fry was

(R-292).
The

court's

ruling

(R-442)

in paragraphs

4 and 5

illustrate the factual disputes that were presented during the
10

course of the trial. The defendant testified that while waiting
for the light to turn green, he looked for oncoming traffic.
After

the

light

intersection.

turned

green,

he

proceeded

into

the

He had observed an on-coming station wagon which

was making a left turn.

He looked for any other on-coming

vehicles which would have posed an immediate hazard and there was
none to be seen.

He then proceeded to make his turn and was

struck by the plaintiff's vehicle.
The

passenger

in

the

(See Statement of Facts).
defendant's

vehicle,

Shelley

Lambert, testified that she also saw the station wagon start to
make a left-hand turn.

She did not observe any other vehicles

which would pose an immediate hazard.

She was comfortable with

Fry proceeding with his turn (TR, pg. 110).
The

defendant's

expert

witness

testified

that

the

larger vehicle provided an obstruction which prevented Fry from
seeing the Petersen vehicle.
the

defendant's

Plaintiff's

actions

experts

As a result, his opinion was that

were

disagreed

not
with

unreasonable.
Fry's

(R-497).

description

of his

actions and testified that in their opinion, Fry was negligent.
The

jury

found

that

Fry's

actions were,

in

fact,

reasonable under the circumstances which the jury determined to
be in existence at the time of the accident.

11

The court in finding no. 9 discusses the case of French
v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 117 Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002 (1950).
The court cited a portion of that decision found on page 1004.
The court failed to cite or to give any weight to that portion of
the French decision which states that the statute dealing with
right of way "anticipates the exercise of reasonable judgment on
the part of the driver turning."

216 P.2d at 1004. The facts in

French were critically different.

The court referred to those

facts as follows:
Visibility was good and no reasons were given
as to why each vehicle was not at all times
clearly visible to the other driver.
216 P.2d at 1003.

(Emphasis added.)

During the course of the trial, and during arguments on
the motion for directed verdict, the court acknowledged that Dr.
Limpert's testimony created a factual dispute as to whether or
not Fry's actions were reasonable.

The court again used the

label "unavoidable accident" in making that determination.

(TR,

pg. 195).
In order

for

the

court

to

reach

the

findings of

paragraphs 12 and 13, the court had to settle critical factual
disputes.

The trial court overstepped its role by resolving

those disputes.
instructions.

The court does have discretion in giving jury
However, the trial court cannot substitute its
12

judgment for that of the jury.

The questions presented to the

jury were (1) what were the circumstances which existed at the
time that Mr. Fry made his turn, and, (2) given those facts and
circumstances, were Mr. Fry's actions reasonable.
underlying

circumstances

presented

Since the

a factual dispute, it was

improper for the trial court to rule that it "cannot find that
this accident was an unavoidable accident."
The

court

in

addition to

finding this was not an

"unavoidable accident," ruled that Fry did not keep a proper
lookout, again resolving the factual dispute which should be
decided by a jury.

An evaluation of the court's ruling indicates

that the court is attempting to, in effect, render Utah Code Ann.
S 41-6-73 a strict liability statute.

Such an effort has been

expressly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court.

In Anderson v.

Tgone, supra at 172, the court held:
The law is well settled in our jurisdiction
that most cases involving negligence are not
susceptible to summary disposition, finding a
defendant negligent as a matter of law.
* * *

Plaintiff reasons that defendant's
failure to keep a proper lookout was
negligence as a matter of law and thus that
issue should not have been submitted to the
jury to be decided. But we have heretofore
held that what constitutes a proper lookout
is a question for the jury as the individual
fact situation in each case does not lend
itself to a rigid application of any rule,
13

but demands instead a determination of the
conditions as they existed at the time of the
accident. (Cite omitted.)
The Utah Supreme Court previously overturned a trial
judge's similar attempts to impose strict liability on a claimed
failure to maintain a proper lookout.

In Durrant v. Pelton, 16

Utah 2d 7, 394 P.2d 879, 881 (1964), the court held:
However, the test "[a]s to what constitutes a
proper lookout is usually * * * a latter-day
classic question for jury determination, and
each trial and appellate court must determine
the question as a matter of law only when
convinced that reasonable persons could not
disagree
upon
the
question
when
conscientiously applying fact to law".
* * *

A jury should determine what a reasonable and
prudent person would do under the conditions
as they existed at the time of the accident.
In Smith v. Galleaos, 16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P.2d 570, 572
(Utah 1965), the court addressed the same issue presented in this
appeal.

It held:
Justice does not sanction any such favoring
of one party at the expense of the other. It
imposes upon all drivers, including not only
the left turner, ... but also upon the
oncoming vehicle . .. the fundamental duty
which pervades the entire law of torts and
from which no one is at any time excused: to
use that degree of care which a reasonable
and prudent person would use under the
circumstances for the safety of himself and
others«
•

*

14

*

If the left turner in performing his duty,
and in making the required observation, sees
no vehicle approaching, or that any coming is
far enough away so that he can reasonably
believe that he has time to make his turn, he
may proceed.
In King v. Fereday, supra, the plaintiff argued that a
rear-end collision constituted a violation of Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-62 and amounted to negligence per se.

The court held:

Plaintiff's argument therefore assumes that
the fact of the collision alone establishes a
violation of the statute.
In McCloud v.
Baum, this Court held that a collision alone
does not create an inference of negligence.
Id. at 1127-28.
Id. at 620.
Finally, in Maltby v. Cox Construction Co., Inc., 598
P.2d 336, 340 (Utah 1979), the court analyzed plaintiff's jury
instruction which would have directed a verdict in their favor.
The court helds
This requested instruction is tantamount
to an instruction that rear-end collisions
are invariably the result of the negligence
of the driver of the following vehicle. The
instruction was properly refused. The Court
properly instructed the jury as to the duties
and responsibilities of each of these parties
to keep a proper lookout, to keep their
respective vehicles under proper control, and
to use such care as a reasonable prudent
person would use under the circumstances.
The jury was persuaded that Pritchard's
actions were reasonable under
these
circumstances, and that plaintiff's were not.
15

spelling

In

light

out

the

of

the

jury's

long

role

standing

to

case

law

determine what

in

Utah

constitutes

issues of negligence, the trial court committed reversible error
in entering its finding that Fry "did not keep a proper lookout
for eastbound on-coming traffic."
It was improper for the trial court judge to attempt to
impose a form of strict liability upon this defendant.
of

Appeals

must

assume

that

the

disputes in favor of defendant Fry.

jury

resolved

The Court

the

factual

The jury concluded that the

conduct of Fry was reasonable and prudent under the facts as they
determined them.

Even those

"findings" reached by the trial

court illustrate the factual conflict that the jury was called
upon to resolve.
POINT IV.
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
FINDING THAT THE JURY WAS CONFUSED. SUCH A
FINDING WAS UNSUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND,
EVEN IF TRUEf WOULD NOT RESULT IN A REVERSAL
OF THE JURY'S VERDICT.
The

trial

court

in paragraph

15 of

its ruling on

plaintiff's motion for directed verdict found:
15. This Court also finds that the jury was
confused in its application of the jury
instructions to the facts of the case by
essentially concluding the collision to be an
unavoidable accident.
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The record is devoid of any facts upon which the court
could have entered such a finding.

The only passing reference to

the jury's deliberations occurred during oral arguments on the
motion for directed verdict.

In making his argument, counsel for

the plaintiff attempted to inform the court of conversations he
had had with a member of the jury.

Those conversations were

objected to and no other references were made to them.

Utah law

is clear on the permissible examination of jury deliberations.
In Cooper v. Evans, 1 Utah 2d 68, 262 P.2d 278, 279 (1953), the
court rejected even the use of formal affidavits from the jurors
after several members of the jury claimed to have misunderstood
the jury instructions.

The court ruled:

Upon the motion for a new trial, proof of
such misunderstanding was proffered in
affidavit form.
These latter matters,
including the proof by affidavit, were
properly disregarded.
Jurors may not thus
impeach their own verdict because of
disappointment or even confusion. (Emphasis
added.)
Even if the trial court's
confusion was

accurate

and supported

"finding" concerning jury
by the record,

such a

finding would not warrant reversal of the jury's verdict.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a)(2) authorizes
a jury verdict to be impeached by the affidavits of a juror only
on certain narrowly defined grounds of

jury misconduct.

In

Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372, 375) (Utah 1983), they held:
17

This court has interpreted Rule 59(a)(2) to
allow an affidavit by juror to impeach the
verdict only when the verdict was determined
by chance or bribery. (Cite omitted.)
The rationale behind such a restriction was spelled out
in State of Utah v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah App. 1989).
The court there ruled that:
The reason for narrowly limiting the
circumstances under which jury affidavits can
be used to impeach a jury verdict is that
otherwise, litigants would obtain juror
affidavits on "all manner of things" and the
process would become interminable and
impracticable.
(Cite omitted).
Further
"[s]uch post mortems would be productive of
no end of mischief and render service as a
juror unbearable".
In the instant matter, plaintiff produced no affidavits
upon which the court could have found that the jury was confused.
Further, such a finding, according to Utah case law, does not
warrant reversal of the jury's verdict.

This "finding" by the

trial court illustrates the court's obsession with the label
"unavoidable accident" and the lack of support for the court's
ruling.
CONCLUSION
Based

solely

on

the

testimony

and

the

reasonable

inferences that were drawn from it, John Fry and Shelley Lambert
created factual disputes.
disputes.

The jury was asked to resolve those

In relying upon the testimony of Rhodes' experts, the
18

court had to believe one set of contested facts over the other.
Those facts the court chose to believe were the opposite of
those

the

jury believed.

Such

actions by the trial court

constitute reversible error.
It is respectfully submitted that the j.n.o.Vc should
be reversed and the jury's verdict should be reinstated.
DATED this ^ P

day of November, 1989.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

SCOTT W.\ CHRlStfENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, this

%DD

day of November, 1989, a true and correct

copy of the foregoing to the* following:
Fred D. Howard, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
120 East 300 North Street
P,0. Box 778
Provo, UT 84603

ftJ&iffM
83-612.51
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ADDENDUM

111^
MAR I 5 1989
iSOM EPPERSON & SMITH!
I,

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*********

HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

RULING

:

JOHN M. FRY and JUDITH L.
FRY

:

Defendant/Third-Party
Plaintiff,

:

JUDGE BOYD L. PARK

v.

:

Civil No. 64,555

WILLIAM C . PETERSEN,

:

Third-Party Defendant.

:
*********

The above captioned matter was tried before a jury on
November 28-30, 1988. On the morning of November 30, 1988, just
prior to rebutal testimony and the Courts reading of the jury
instructions to the jury and final arguments, attorney Fred
Howard moved the Court for a Directed Verdict on the issue of
liability of the Defendant, John M. Fry.

Attorney Howard made an

oral Motion and also submitted his Motion in writing, supported
by a written Memorandum entitled "Plaintiff's Memorandum In
Opposition To An Instruction On Unavoidable Accident And In
Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For Directed Verdict."

The Court

heard oral argument, and Scott W. Christensen, attorney for

Utf?

'

Defendant Fryf requested an opportunity to file a Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Memorandum.

The Court granted attorney

Christensen's request and took the Motion under advisement.

The

jury trial continued and the question of Defendant John M. Fry's
negligence was submitted to the jury.

The parties had previously

stipulated that the Plaintiff was not negligent.

At the

conclusion of the testimony of the witnesses the Court granted
attorney Ray Phillips Ivie's Motion for Directed Verdict for
Defendant William C. Petersen, the Court finding no evidence was
produced during the trial showing Defendent Petersen to be
negligent.

The jury returned the special verdict form finding

Defendant John M. Fry not negligent.
The parties now having submitted all the Memorandum in
Support of and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Directed
Verdict and the Court having heard oral arguments and being fully
advised in the premises makes the following findings and ruling:
FINDINGS
1.

On or about December 11, 1982, the Defendant, John M.

Fry, was driving a 1979 Chevrolet CIO pick-up truck which was
involved in a collision with a 1966 two-door Volkeswagen driven
by Third-Party Defendant, William C. Petersen. The accident
occurred at the intersection of State Road 265 and Main Street in
Orem, Utah at approximately 6s22 p.m..
regulated by traffic lights.

The intersection was

2.

The Plaintiff, Harold Edwin Rhodes, was a passenger in

the vehicle driven by Third-Party Defendant, William C. Petersen.
The occupants of the Petersen vehicle were all rendered
unconscious from the accident and have no memory of the
circumstances occurring at the time of the accident.
3.

Prior to the collision, the Fry vehicle was travelling

west bound on State Road—265, and the Petersen vehicle east
bound.

Defendant Fry testified that he brought his vehicle to a

stop at the intersection while he faced a red light.

When the

light turned green, he perceived a station wagon approaching that
was going to make a left turn. He did not see the Petersen
vehicle, and therefore proceeded to turn to the left across the
eastbound lane of travel of the Petersen vehicle.

In an attempt

to avoid Defendant Fry's vehicle, as it turned in front of
Petersen's vehicle, Petersen applied the brakes and his vehicle
laid down 35 feet 11 inches of tire skid marks, before the point
of impact between the two vehicles.
4.

(See Exhibits 2 and 10)

The investigating Officer, Fran Fillmore and accident

reconstructionists, Newell Knight and Greg Duval, testified that
Defendant Fry was negligent.
5.

John M. Fry's expert accident reconstructionist, Rudolph

Limpert, stated on direct examination when asked:

"Based on your

experience in accident investigation and reconatruction, what
caused this accident?":

M

A set of unfortunate circumstances,
a vehicle driving behind a station
wagon, a large domestic or American
station wagon that's some distance
behind. One could calculate how small
that Volkeswagen is in relationship
to the perspective of that big car,
the station wagon obstructing it's
view. And then the unfortunate accident
occurred. So I don't see anything
unreasonable in terms of the left turn
by Mr. Fry when he made the left turn."
(Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings,
Testimony of Rudolph Limpert, November
29, 1988, 2:10 p.m. transcribed p.30)
6.

The jury by Special Verdict found Defendant, John M.

Fry, not negligent.

The jury finding, together with the Court's

instruction to the jury that the Plaintiff was not negligent as
stipulated by the parties and further that the Court had found as
a matter of law Defendant Petersen was not negligent, resulted in
what would have to be termed an unavoidable accident«

The Court

had refused to give an unavoidable accident instruction.

The

jury further found Plaintiff, Harold E. Rhodes, incurred
$21,000.00 in special damages and $29,000.00 in general damages.
7.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-73, which was

submitted as jury instruction No. 23, states:
The operator of a vehicle intending to
turn to the left shall yield the rightof-way to any vehicle approaching from
the opposite direction which is so close
to the turning vehicle as to constitute
an immediate hazard.

8.

This Court finds that Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-

6-73, is applicable to the case at bar and creates a statutory
duty on all operators of motor vehicles who make left hand turns
to " . . . yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from
the opposite direction which is so close to the turning vehicle
as to constitute an immediate hazard."
9.

This Court also follows the ruling in French v. Utah Oil

Ref. Co., 117 Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002, 1004 (1950) wherein the
Utah Supreme Court held:
• . . a burden is placed on the driver
making the turn as he has control of
the situation, and if there is a reasonable
probability that the movement cannot be
made in safety then the disfavored driver
should yield. The driver proceeding
straight ahead has little opportunity to
know a vehicle is to be turned across his
path until the movement is commenced and
in many instances, the warning is too late
for the latter driver to take effective
action.
10c

The Court also adheres to the rationale of Yeates v.

Budge, 122 Utah 518, 252 P.2d 220 (1953) wherein the Utah Supreme
Court held that where a defendant attempted to turn across the
path of the plaintiff, when he was only 40 feet away, the trial
court could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff was so close
as to constitute an immediate hazard and that the defendant
should have yielded the right-of-way to him.
11.

This Court is reluctant to take from the jury its fact

finding responsibility regarding negligence of the parties and

whether the negligence was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's
injuries.

The Court is mindful of those cases in which the

Supreme Court has concluded that juries should be fact finders.
(Mel Hardntan Productions, Inc.f v. Robinson, 604 P. 2d 913, 917
(Utah 1979))
12.

The Court however, given all the testimony of the

witnesses, and in fairness and equity cannot find that this
accident was an unavoidable accident. The Utah Supreme Court has
defined an unavoidable accident as " . . . an unusual and
unexpected occurrence "which result[s] in injury and which
happen[s] without anyone failing to exercise reasonable care . .
*

M

(Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corporation, 681 P.2d 1232,

1237 (Utah 1984)) and (Stringham v. Broderick, 529 P.2d 425, 426
(Utah 1974)
13.

Even should this Court ignore the testimony of those

witnesses who testified that Defendant Fry was negligent and look
only to the testimony of Fry's witness, Rudy Limpert, (according
to his calculations this was an unfortunate accident), this Court
is of the opinion that the accident was not an unavoidable
accident as defined by the Supreme Court of this state.
14.

This Court finds that Defendant, John M. Fry, made a

left hand turn across on coming traffic heading eastbound along
State Road 265 and did not keep a proper lookout for eastbound
oncoming traffic which resulted in his colliding with Third-Party

Defendant, William C. Petersen's vehicle thus violating his
statutory duty pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-73.
15.

This Court also finds that the jury was confused in

its application of the jury instructions to the facts of the case
by essentially concluding the collision to be an unavoidable
accident.
16.

This Court further finds that Plaintiff, Harold Edwin

Rhodes, is entitled to a Directed Verdict holding that Defendant,
John M. Fry, negligently operated his vehicle which was the
proximate cause of the Plaintifffs injuries.

RULING
1.

Plaintiff, Harold Edwin Rhodes', Motion for a Directed

Verdict is granted.
2.

Counsel for the Plaintiff is to prepare an Order

consistent with the above Ruling.
DATED this £% day of March, 1989.
BY THE COURT

ccs

Fred Howard, Esq
R. Phil Ivie, Esq.
Scott Christensen, Esq.

FRED D. HOWARD (1547), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 Sac* 300 North Strati
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Ttltphont: (801)373-8345

OurFil«No. 14,608

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT

vs.

JOHN M. FRY, JUDITH L.
FRY and WILLIAM C PETERSON,
Defendants.

Civil No. 64,555
Judge Cullen Y„ Christenscn

Comes now the plaintiff and moves the court for a directed verdict on the issue
of liability for the reasons and upon the grounds as follows:
1.

The Court has ruled that the driver of the plaintiffs car was not

negligent as a matter of law.
2.

There can be no fault imputed to the plaintiff.

3.

The defendant, Fry, cannot rely upon the defense of unavoidable

accident because this is not the "rare9 case in which such an instruction would be
permissible. See memorandum attached.

4.

The defendant has proffered no excuse or explanation for the accident.

There are no facts that would explain the events giving rise to the collision except the
negligence of the defendant
The plaintiff respectfully submits he is entitled to a directed verdict as a
matter of right and that it would be error to fail to grant this motion.
DATED this

ffi

day of November, 1988.

FREb D. HOWAR'D, foi/
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

HAND DELIVERED to Scott Christensen this < £ 2 - d a v

of

November, 1988.

K(Et> D. HOWARD, for
7IOWARD, LE^VIS & PET
PETERSEN
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